Duty and Desertion: Simon of Montfort and the Fourth Crusade by Lippiatt, G
G.E.M. Lippiatt 
DUTY AND DESERTION: SIMON OF MONTFORT AND THE FOURTH 
CRUSADE 
Leidschrift 27 (2012), pp. 75-88  
G.E.M. Lippiatt !1
 Simon V of Montfort (c.1175-1218) is chiefly remembered for his leadership of the 
Albigensian Crusade (1209-1218), with his participation in the Fourth Crusade (1198-1204) 
receiving only passing mention as an interesting but unrelated anecdote.  The two crusades have 
largely been studied independently of each other: the popular allure of the ‘Cathars’ and teh 
perceived brutality employed by Simon in their suppression provide the focus of interest in the 
Albigensian Crusade, while Fourth Crusade historians centre on the action surrounding the siege 
and appalling sack of Constantinople, events at which Simon was not present.  As a result, 
references to Simon of Montfort in modern historiography focus heavily on the last nine years of 
his life, often to the neglect of earlier and equally interesting episodes.  This article cannot, of 
course, attempt a comprehensive analysis of his character in Fourth and Albigensian Crusade 
sources, but will try to explore more fully Simon’s actions during his first crusade experience, in 
particular his responses to competing crusade obligations leading up to his desertion from the 
main army in early 1203.  This will provide an important building block in an historical 
reconstruction of Simon and, by extension, the crusading baron in the early thirteenth century. 
 The primary interest in Simon’s role in the Fourth Crusade comes from his opposition to 
the joint Venetian and crusader attack on the Dalmatian city of Zara in November 1202.  The 
crusaders had contracted Venice the previous year to construct a fleet to transport them to Egypt; 
however, the crusading army that arrived at the city in 1202 was smaller than expected and 
therefore unable to pay the determined sum.  The crusade leaders agreed to settle the outstanding 
balance by helping the Venetians to conquer Zara (a persistent thorn in the side of the Republic 
of Saint Mark) despite papal insistence that the crusade must not attack Christians.  The 
expedition and Simon’s hostility to it are well-documented in the contemporary histories of 
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Robert of Clari and Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay.  The greatest chronicle of the Fourth Crusade, that 
of Geoffrey of Villehardouin, does not explicitly mention Simon among that party of crusaders 
which attempted to subvert the venture, but Geoffrey does agree with Peter in his account of the 
public defiance of the attack by Simon’s close friend and Peter’s uncle, Abbot Guy of Vaux-de-
Cernay.   This incident raises the question on which this article will focus: if Simon was so 1
opposed to any move by the crusade against Zara, to the point of public dissent and finally 
desertion, why did he agree to accompany the enterprise when it sailed from Venice in the first 
place? 
The principal accounts 
 There exist two substantial eyewitness descriptions of the meeting between the Venetian 
and crusade leaders and the Zaran envoys on 12 November.  The purpose of Peter of Vaux-de-
Cernay’s Hystoria albigensis is to celebrate and justify the Albigensian Crusade and its major 
leaders, including his uncle and Simon of Montfort.  Therefore, in order to provide an example of 
the outstanding virtues of his heroes, Peter gives a description of the crusader council in 1202, 
where his uncle played a prominent role in the opposition party.  He records Guy reading a letter 
from Pope Innocent III threatening excommunication and forfeiture of crusading indulgences to 
those who participate in an attack upon the city.  Peter claims that the angry Venetians then 
attempt to kill Guy, but were prevented by Simon, who personally interposed himself in the 
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centre of the council and told the Zaran envoys that neither he nor his followers would do any 
harm to the city.  He then left the council with his vassals.  2
 Geoffrey of Villehardouin’s Conquête de Constantinople, a memoir of and justification 
for the controversial course of events leading to the denouement of the Fourth Crusade, presents 
a slightly different picture of the council.  The Zarans, cowed by the strength of the Venetian 
fleet combined with the crusader army, dispatched envoys to Doge Enrico Dandolo offering their 
submission.  However, while the doge conferred privately with the rest of the leadership about 
the terms of the city’s surrender, another party of crusaders, labelled by Geoffrey as ‘those who 
wished to disperse the army’ stated to the envoys that neither they nor the other crusaders would 
attack Zara and relayed this same information to the citizens at large.  The Zarans, confident that 
they could resist the isolated Venetians as they had in the past, abandoned the negotiations and 
returned to the city.  After they left, Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay, in the name of the pope, forbade the 
assembled barons to attack the city.   Although Simon is not mentioned explicitly here, given his 3
close association with Guy and later desertion with him, he seems to lurk just behind the text of 
Geoffrey’s version of the council.  The accounts of Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay and the less well-
informed Robert of Clari noting Simon’s prominent role in the dissenting party are corroborated 
by Geoffrey’s description of his eventual defection and the later but independent tradition based 
on the chronicle attributed to Ernoul.   So why did Simon accompany the fleet from Venice to 4
Zara if he was so opposed to the capitulation of the city under any circumstances? 
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Ignorance 
 One possibility is that Simon was not informed of the crusade leaders’ intention to attack 
Zara when the fleet departed.  Robert of Clari claims that ‘no one in the host knew anything of 
this counsel, except for the most important men.’   However, Robert was much lower on the 5
social scale than Simon, and both he and Geoffrey of Villehardouin certainly count Simon among 
‘the most important men’ in their histories, listing him alongside the counts among those who 
took the cross.   Furthermore, Geoffrey of Villehardouin reports objections to the Venetians’ 6
proposal from the beginning among those crusaders ‘who wishes that the armywould disband’, 
while Gunther of Pairis, a German Cistercian who was not an eyewitness, tells of a heated and 
protracted debate over the plan, suggesting that word of the compromise had leaked beyond the 
handful of men who were party to the 1201 Treaty of Venice.   Thus Simon’s social prominence 7
and the probability of a general lack of secrecy make it unlikely that Simon did not know of the 
diversion to Zara. 
 Another possibility is that Simon was aware of or suspected the diversion, but did not 
oppose it until the publication of the papal letter forbidding it.  Simon’s stand as recorded in 
Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay shows a determination and moral superiority out of keeping with this 
interpretation.  However, this may only be a result of Peter’s interest in portraying Simon as the 
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miles Christi, guided positively by Christian principle rather than negatively by fear of 
excommunication.  Perhaps Simon had no inherent moral problem with the attack on Zara, and 
only objected to it on the grounds that it was censured by the pope.  After all, as Donald Queller 
and Thomas Madden point out, the Venetians’ intention to subdue an antagonistic territory on 
their way to Outremer had precedent among previous crusading lords, such as King Richard I of 
England in 1191.    Innocent had warned the crusaders against attacking Christians in his 8
confirmation of the Treaty of Venice, but perhaps Simon had not heard of this initial prohibition, 
and the ambiguity of Peter of Capua, the papal legate, would have further confused the issue.   9
The greatest flaw in this theory of ignorance is that Simon had almost certainly seen the papal 
letter before the fleet sailed from Venice.  Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay, who had the letter at Zara, 
had almost certainly received it before leaving port.   Given the intimacy between the abbot and 10
Simon, it is difficult to imagine the latter not having the same information as the former. 
Opportunities and obligations 
 And yet Guy did not publish the letter in Venice, and both he and Simon departed with 
the fleet, knowing of both the diversion to Zara and the papal prohibition against attacking 
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 ‘Gesta episcoporum Halberstadensium’, in Monumenta Germaniae historica: Scriptorum, ed. G.H. Pertz, xxiii 9
(Hanover, 1874), pp. 73-123: 117; Gunther of Pairis, Hystoria Constantinopolitana, pp. 122-3; ‘Gesta Innocentii PP. 
III’, in Patrologia latina, ed. J.-P. Migne, ccxiv (Paris, 1855), c. cxxxi; ‘Innocentii III Romani pontificis regestorum 
sive epistolarum’, in ibid., ccxv, cc. 301-2; E. John, ‘A Note on the Preliminaries of the Fourth Crusade’, Byzantion 
28 (1958), p. 102; D.E. Queller, ‘Innocent III and the Crusader-Venetian Treaty of 1201’, Medievalia et Humanistica 
15 (1963), pp. 31-4; Queller and Madden, Fourth Crusade, pp. 19-20.
 A hypothetical reconstruction of the letter’s journey to Zara is based on the evidence from ‘Gesta episcoporum 10
Halberstadensium’, p. 117; and ‘Gesta Innocentii’, cc. cxxxviii-cxxxix.  The most effective synthesis is summarised 
with citations in Queller and Madden, Fourth Crusade, p. 244n. 105.
G.E.M. Lippiatt !6
Christians.  It is likely that Guy was one of the four Cistercian abbots attached to the army by 
Peter of Capua as vice-legates to prevent the shedding of Christian blood.   Perhaps a debate 11
continued between Guy and Simon on one side and the crusade leaders and Venetians on the 
other, up to and after the fleet departed Venice.  Failing to resolve the issue with the leadership 
and seeing the point of no return approaching, Guy may then have published the letter to the 
barons in council at Zara in a final (unsuccessful) effort to ensure the pope’s will was obeyed.  
The sources do not give any explicit evidence of such a debate while the fleet was en route, but if 
the plan was really a secret (even a poorly kept one) among the highest ranks, Guy and Simon 
may have felt it best to wait until the leaders plainly revealed their intentions, thus giving them 
an opportunity to save face and prevent further disillusionment and desertion in Venice.  If the 
latter is the case, it is worth pointing out that Guy and Simon may have been trying to hold the 
crusade together by reserving the letter, an ironic hypothesis in light of Geoffrey’s fulminations.  
The landing at Zara also may have been the first opportunity to address the entire assembled 
baronage, who would earlier have been spread amongst their various ships.  Moreover, one 
should not discount the personal danger that an attempt to publish the letter might incur.  Peter of 
Vaux-de-Cernay’s scene of Venetians threatening Guy with murder in the middle of a council 
may be largely for dramatic effect, but while at the mercy of the Venetians—as guests in their 
city or passengers in their fleet—the (explicit or implicit) threat of assassination to stifle dissent 
was not impossible.  In this light, Simon’s removal of his tents to some distance from the main 
crusader camp at Zara takes on more significance than simply refusing to associate with sinners; 
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it also increased his personal security and that of his circle.   Thus for a variety of reasons, it 12
may have been impractical for Guy to publish the letter any earlier than he did. 
 Still, Simon and his followers could have refused to embark at Venice and sailed for Syria 
from some other port.  Many crusaders took this option out of diverse motives; a fact that 
seriously compromised the main host’s ability to pay for their contracted fleet in the first place, 
thereby placing it in the debt of the Venetians.  The controversial decision to attack Zara seems to 
have compounded this hæmorrhage of troops.  As later events made clear, Simon could have 
followed the same course before arriving at Venice.  After the mustering of the host, the 
Devastatio Constantinopolitana and Robert of Clari report that the Venetians effectively 
imprisoned the crusaders on the island of San Nicolò in the lagoon, where food and potable 
water quickly became scarce; but as neither Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, 
nor Gunther of Pairis mention these hardships, it may be that these measures only seriously 
affected the poorer pilgrims.  At any rate, crusaders did desert from Venice, and it is hard to 
imagine Simon not being able to make his escape when so many lesser men were able to do so.   13
Furthermore, unlike modern armies, a crusading host was a very loose and entirely voluntary 
organisation.  Simon seems to have implicitly approved of the Treaty of Venice, but could still 
 Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, Hystoria albigensis, i p. 108-9; A.J. Andrea and I. Motsiff, ‘Pope Innocent III and the 12
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conceivably have interpreted his crusading vows as primarily involving reaching the Holy Land 
rather than remaining with the main army.  14
 However, Simon did stay with the main army all the way to Zara.  This fact alone seems 
to discredit Geoffrey of Villehardouin’s accusation that Simon and his followers ‘wished to 
disperse the host’.   They were obviously committed to the success of the enterprise, and 15
believed that that success depended on the unity of the host.  The fact that Simon had fought on 
the opposite side from many of the crusade’s leaders during the wars between King Philip II of 
France and Richard of England further suggests the gravity Simon attached to the crusade.   16
Simon’s continued presence demonstrates his dedication to the central initiative of the crusade 
(before its agreement with Alexius Angelus, pretender to the imperial throne of Constantinople); 
what remains unclear are the reasons for his fidelity. 
 Monique Zerner-Chardavoine and Hélène Piéchon-Palloc believe that Simon was 
compelled to remain with the host, as well as to oppose the attack on Zara, by his own ambition.  
Looking at Simon’s behaviour in light of his later successes on the Albigensian Crusade, they 
argue that his stand at Zara was a power-play intended to bring the crusade under his influence, a 
precursor to his pretensions to the county of Toulouse.  Having failed to convince his friend 
Duke Odo III of Burgundy in 1201 to lead the crusade, jealous of the subsequent election of 
Boniface of Montferrat in preference to himself, and sidelined in the negotiation of the Treaty of 
Venice, Simon hoped by defying the Venetians to run the crusade from its cynical undertaking 
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back to its true purpose, under his own (at least partial) direction.   It was not until the army’s 17
disregard for papal censure and new commitment to interfering in Byzantine politics had swept 
away all chance of directing that policy toward immediate embarkation for Outremer that Simon 
decided to abandon his ambition to gain control of the crusade. 
 But this psychology rests on fairly shaky and entirely speculative grounds: to interpret 
Simon’s behaviour on the Fourth Crusade in the light of his ambitions in the Midi a decade later 
is to strain the evidence.  As noted above, Simon was certainly a noble of great repute and high 
standing in the army, but he was neither as wealthy nor as politically significant in 1198-1203 as 
Boniface or the great counts who took the cross.  He may have disliked the Venetians (Peter of 
Vaux-de-Cernay certainly did ), but he apparently respected their importance to the crusade’s 18
success enough not to abandon the army at the first sign of trouble in Venice.  Finally, his 
involvement in the embassy to Odo of Burgundy was more likely due to his personal intimacy 
with the duke than an influential position in the leadership that was later eclipsed.   Simon and 19
Odo would crusade together multiple times in the Languedoc, and Simon’s eldest son, Amalric, 
would marry Odo’s neice, Beatrice of Viennois, in 1214.  A connection between the two men 
before the Albigensian Crusade is difficult to prove, but it is heavily implied by the fact that in 
1208 Odo ‘asked the count of Montfort if he would join the army of Jesus Christ agains the 
heretics with him and be in his company; presenting and offering many great gifts, if [Simon] 
would be willing to grant him this.’   Such relationships were important in mediæval society, 20
 M. Zerner-Chardavoine and H. Piéchon-Palloc, ‘La croisade albigeoise, une revanche: Des rapports entre la 17
quatrième croisade et la croisade albigeoise’, Revue historique 267 (1982), pp. 16-7.
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and the counts probably hoped that Simon’s friendship, common loyalty to Philip II, and 
enthusiasm for the Cistercians might persuade Odo to leave his lands to aid the Franks in 
Outremer.  However, Simon’s participation in the embassy alone cannot be taken as proof that he 
had once been closely involved in planning crusade policy. 
Taking a stand and practical concerns 
 More importantly, by 12 November a crossing of the Mediterranean was nearly 
impossible, even if Simon had forced the fleet to move on from Zara immediately.  The long 
delay at Venice meant that winter was now fast approaching, and the coming season was 
dangerous for a mediæval fleet.  Robert of Clari notes that even when the crusade departed from 
Venice, in the first week of October, it was already too late to travel all the way to their 
destination at Alexandria.   Simon may not have been a sailor, but after spending the summer in 21
a maritime city and the last month on board a ship, he must have known, as the lesser knight 
Robert did, that the fleet could not cross the sea until the arrival of spring and fairer weather. 
 The impossibility of sailing in November raises the question of what Simon was trying to 
accomplish by his intervention in the Zaran-Venetian negotiations.  Geoffrey has the dissenters—
after Enrico Dandolo had stepped out to confer with the crusader barons over the surrender—tell 
the Zaran emissaries, ‘The crusaders will not attack you.  If you can defend yourselves from the 
Venetians, you will be safe.’   However, Peter places less subversive words in Simon’s mouth, 22
 Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Conquête de Constantinople, i p. 86; Robert of Clari, Conquête de Constantinople, p. 21
12; Queller and Madden, Fourth Crusade, pp. 54, 72.
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spoken in the midst of the entire assembly of crusaders and Venetians: ‘I will do you no harm, 
and, whatever others many do, I hold you safe from me and mine.’   The discrepancy between 23
these two eyewitness accounts arises from both being partisan chroniclers trying to prove 
important, though unrelated, points through this single scene.  For Geoffrey, the wrecking of the 
negotiations is another opportunity to heap accusations of ill will and treachery on those who did 
not accompany the crusading army to Constantinople.  For Peter, Simon’s refusal to attack Zara 
reinforces the virtue of the anti-heresy expedition of 1209; as Simon would not fight against 
Christians on the Fourth Crusade, the enemies of the Albigensian Crusade must not have been 
true Christians.  Both men are more concerned with the propaganda value of the event than in 
reporting it accurately. 
 Though Peter’s version of the council is suspiciously exciting, with threats of violence by 
cynical Venetians against a virtuous but unarmed abbot and the courageous intervention and 
dramatic exit of Simon, the principled hero, his version of the message of the dissenting party to 
the Zaran emissaries is preferable to Geoffrey’s.  The reasons for the doge needing to confer with 
the crusade barons before accepting the submission are unclear; if Zara surrendered, it would 
surrender to the Venetians, not the crusaders, who in any case could not have opposed a 
bloodless capitulation.  The dissenters, for their part, seem to have had nothing to gain by 
inciting the Zarans to resist: sailing for the Holy Land before spring was impossible, and if the 
Zarans were about to surrender, encouraging them to fight would not help speed the crusade on 
its way.  Simon may have been hoping to lead by example and thus take the wind out of the 
Venetians’ sails, but the violent outcome of actively encouraging defiance in the Zarans was 
 Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, Hystoria albigensis, i p. 109.23
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predictable enough.  Geoffrey also routinely misconstrues the intentions of those who disagreed 
with the policies of the crusade leadership, consistently attributing to them a single-minded 
devotion toward disbanding the army.   In light of the circumstances, Peter’s depiction of Simon 24
and his followers personally abstaining from combat operations at Zara—an abstention which 
may have sufficiently emboldened the Zarans to cease trying to placate the Venetians—holds 
more plausibility than Geoffrey’s accusations of outright treason and active subversion. 
 A reasonable reconstruction of Simon’s actions and motivations (inasmuch as they may 
be perceived and understood) during the Fourth Crusade must therefore synthesise the evidence 
with the practical concerns discussed above.  Although Simon likely knew of the diversion to 
Zara as well as the papal prohibition against it before or soon after the fleet departed from 
Venice, he remained with the army until it arrived.  Both idealistic and pragmatic explanations 
present themselves for this apparent conflict.  It is important not to downplay the significance of 
honour in the decisions of a man like Simon.  While he was not bound by formal arrangements 
such as contract or vassalage to the Treaty of Venice, he had taken crusading vows which in a 
loose sense tied him to the body that was set to muster and depart from Venice.  Furthermore, 
Innocent himself, in support of the treaty, had ordered those who had taken the cross to assemble 
at Venice with the main host.   After arriving in Venice, this sense of obligation would only have 25
increased, as the expedition (slowly) gained momentum.  Though he disagreed with the diversion 
to Zara and refused to participate himself, Simon’s honour may have dictated that he stay with 
the fleet so long as it remained destined for the Holy Land. 
 Ibid., pp. 108-9; Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Conquête de Constantinople, i pp. 62, 66, 82, 96, 100, 104, 116; 24
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 These ideals would have been reinforced by practical concerns. Simon may well have 
sympathised—to a point—with Geoffrey’s disparagement of those smaller bands who left the 
army: the fear that piecemeal contingents of crusaders would be unable to give much aid to the 
Kingdom of Jerusalem was a real one.   In the event, Simon and other crusaders who reached 26
Outremer were able to achieve limited successes in 1203-1204 that bolstered the defences of the 
Frankish kingdom.   But it would be foolish to imagine that any of the crusaders could have 27
foreseen that.  A massed army, even if arriving a bit later than expected, would be better able to 
recapture Jerusalem than would small and staggered groups of knights.  Thus Simon likely 
believed that the best chance of fulfilling his crusading vows lay with the the army, so long as it 
remained destined for the Levant. 
 Financial concerns also would have made remaining with the crusade army at Venice 
preferable to a party the size of Simon’s contingent.  Important baron though he was, Simon 
could not hope to match the resources of the greater magnates like the counts of Champagne, 
Blois, or Flanders.  It therefore made the most economic sense to pool his funds with these 
counts and the rest of the crusader army, as this would make transport much more affordable.  
When a large proportion of the army failed to muster at Venice and the crusaders could not pay 
for the fleet, many were forced to return home, unable to afford either other passage or further 
 Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Conquête de Constantinople, i pp. 97, 104, 118.26
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absence from their lands.   While Simon was certainly wealthier than these crusaders, he also 28
had the expenses of a larger retinue.  In the end, his desertion and departure for Outremer via a 
difficult trek to Barletta demonstrates that independent travel was not impossible,  but his 29
responsibilities and limited funds dictated that such a decision could not be taken lightly. 
The final straw 
 The very point at which Simon did make the decision to abandon the army is perhaps 
most instructive for determining his attitude towards the extent of his obligations to the concerted 
effort.  Despite his opposition to the attack on Zara and his failure to stop it, he did not leave the 
army in November.  Robert of Clari claims that Simon wintered in Hungary while the crusaders 
camped in the ruins of Zara, and the Ernoul chronicle gives the same impression; but the 
former’s chronology is notoriously unreliable, and the latter was not an eyewitness.   Geoffrey 30
of Villehardouin, who was party to the councils surrounding the determination of crusade policy, 
reports Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay as once more opposing the diversion of the crusade in the winter 
of 1203; this time to Constantinople, at the behest of King Philip of Germany and Alexius 
Angelus.  Geoffrey again glosses over Simon’s involvement; perhaps because of Simon’s 
prominent reputation as leader of the Albigensian Crusade at the time of Geoffrey’s dictation.  
Guy, however, took a lively part in this debate and then, as the fleet set sail around Easter 1203, 
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Geoffrey reports that he went his own way with Simon and Guy of Montfort, Simon of 
Neauphle, Robert Mauvoisin, Dreux of Cressonsacq, and ‘many others’.  This is confirmed by 
the Devastatio Constantinopolitana, where Simon’s desertion is similarly attributed to the 
crusade leadership’s decision to aid Alexius, and even the chronicle of Ernoul recognises that 
Simon was accompanied to the Holy Land by the abbot of Vaux-de-Cernay.  It is odd that Peter 
of Vaux-de-Cernay makes no mention of the importance of the diversion to Constantinople in 
Simon’s defection, but he may have wished to give the impression that Simon’s departure was 
due to the attack on Zara—an event that unequivocally incurred excommunication—rather than 
the decision to go to Constantinople—a decision that at the time of Peter’s writing in 1213 was 
looked upon in a more favourable light, as it had established the Latin Empire and seemingly 
brought about the reunion of the Church.   Nevertheless, Simon’s abandonment of the crusade 31
army apparently was precipitated not by the Zaran affair—distasteful as he may have found it—
but rather by the leadership’s continued policy of using the army for purposes other than 
attacking the Ayyubids in the Levant. 
 This fact, rarely noted in treatments of Simon in the Fourth Crusade, provides the key to 
understanding his attitude toward the crusade, both in his dedication to and desertion of the army.  
Far from being a saboteur or ‘più papista del Papa’,  he seems, with Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay, to 32
have consistently upheld papal wishes, which emphasised both unity of effort and purity of 
purpose.  The actions of Simon and his followers were harmonious with both of these aims.  
 Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Conquête de Constantinople, i pp. 94-8, 110-2; ‘Devastatio Constantinopolitana’, p. 31
133; Chronique d’Ernoul, p. 351; ‘Estoire de Eracles’, p. 255; Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, Hystoria albigensis, i p. 
110; see also Zerner-Chardavoine and Piéchon-Palloc ‘Une revanche’, pp. 8-10, 17; and M. Zerner-Chardavoine, 
‘L’abbé Gui des Vaux-de-Cernay: prédicateur de croisade’, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 21 (1986), pp. 191-2 which claim 
Peter’s account of the Fourth Crusade is primarily an apologetic and therefore unreliable, but their argument relies 
on unnecessary assumptions and tenuous interpretations of the evidence.
 L. Usseglio, I marchesi di Monferrato in Italia ed in Oriente durante i secoli XII e XIII, ii (Turin, 1926), p. 210.32
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Refusing to participate in the attack on a Christian city, he remained with the army according to 
Innocent’s instructions in his absolution of the other crusaders.  However, when the army set out 
to attack yet another Christian city in contravention to those same instructions, Simon could see 
that, despite the leaders’ assurances to the contrary, the crusade had lost its way.   At that point, 33
preferring to save their own souls—the aim, after all, for which they had taken the cross—he and 
the abbot refused to sail with the fleet and made for Syria on their own. 
 This understanding of Simon’s decision to abandon the army throws into stark relief the 
difference between him—and perhaps some of the other barons who formed part of the 
‘neglected majority’ of the Fourth Crusade—and a man like Geoffrey of Villehardouin.  Their 
conceptions of the crusade were not fundamentally opposed, but they measured the progress of 
the enterprise by different standards.  For both men, the crusade was a means of performing 
service to Christendom and achieving salvation.  For Geoffrey the most important element of 
pursuing this aim was maintaining fidelity to the corporate body of crusaders; for Simon, it was 
fulfilling his own crusading vows by fighting in Syria or Egypt.  The pope had stressed both, and 
Simon as well as Geoffrey recognised their interdependence.  But the crisis presented by the 
Constantinopolitan option had made these elements—at least from Simon’s perspective—
irreconcilable, and he acted in accordance with his priorities.  This independent impulse may 
foreshadow his spectacular later career in the Midi, but it does not speak only of ambition.  
Rather, it suggests a conception of the crusade that differed from that of the leadership—one that 
was likely shared, if not always acted upon, by many other nobles amidst the confusion of the 
Fourth Crusade.
 ‘Innocentii III regestorum’, ccxiv cc. 1178-82, ccxv cc. 50, 106-10; Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Conquête de 33
Constantinople, i p. 92; Robert of Clari, Conquête de Constantinople, p. 32.
